Sue H. Mialon

 

Research

 To contact me:

Department of Economics

Emory University

Atlanta, GA 30322

Phone: 404-712-8169

Fax: 404-727-4639

E-mail:  smialon@emory.edu

PUBLICATIONS

1.              “Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis ,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 92, No. 10-11, October 2008, pp. 1863-1875 ,  with R. Preston McAfee and Hugo Mialon.   (Lead Article)

2.              “Efficient Horizontal Mergers: The Effects of Internal Capital Reallocation and Organizational Form,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 26, No. 4, July 2008, pp.861-877 (Lead Article).

3.             “Do Sunk Costs Matter?” Economic Inquiry, Forthcoming, with R. Preston McAfee and Hugo Mialon

4.              “The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Economic Analysis,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 24, No.1,  2008, pp. 22-44, with Hugo Mialon.

5.              “ Pricing Access in Network Competition,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 109-123.

6.              “Does Large Price Discrimination imply Great Market Power ?” Economics Letters, Vol. 92, No. 3, September 2006, pp. 360-367, with R. Preston McAfee, and Hugo Mialon.

                 Technical Appendix

7.              “Violence Against Women, Social Learning, and Deterrence,”  Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 16, No. 4, October 2006, pp.367-82, , with Hugo Mialon. 

8.             “Private Antitrust Litigation: Pro-competitive or Anti-competitive?”  The Political Economy of Antitrust, Edited by Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek, North-Holland, ISBN-10: 0-444-53093-2, March 2007, with R. Preston McAfee, and Hugo Mialon.

9.              “Sinful Indulgences, Soft Substitutes, and Self-Control,” Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 12 , No. 12, October 2005 , with Hugo Mialon. (Lead Article)         

                

WORKING PAPERS

10. “Torture in Counterterrorism: Agency Incentives and Slippery Slopes,”  under revision,  with Hugo Mialon and Max Stinchcombe

11. “The Economics of Search Warrants,” under revision, with Hugo Mialon

12. “An Empirical Study of Sexual Violence,” under revision,  with Hugo Mialon.

13. “Scientific Originality and the Economics of Publishing,” with Hugo Mialon.

14. “Exclusionary Bundling: The Motive for Mergers,” under review.

 

WORK IN PROGRESS

1.              “Intertemporal Bundling under Demand Uncertainty,” under revision, with Jihui Chen

Abstract: We develop a simple two-period model of bundling strategy when a monopolistic firm faces uncertain demand in the second period. We examine the effect of bundling on market outcomes in two cases: when the monopolist commits to a future price and when it does not. In equilibrium, under no capacity constraint and no commitment to a future price, the optimal bundling strategy induces substantial increase in prices in the first period. In this case, bundling is profitable but anti-competitive as it reduces consumers surplus. However, if the monopolist can commit to the second period price, bundling does not affect the profit or the welfare. We also consider the effects of capacity constraint on bundling strategy. In general, the monopolist is inclined to offer bundling only if the optimal prices under bundling lessen capacity constraint.

 

2.              “Identity v. Popularity,” under revision, with Hugo Mialon

Abstract:  We model individuals' choices of which social group to belong to, emphasizing the tension between their preference to be in one social group rather than another and their preference to be in a social group that matches their own social identity. Individuals are initially uncertain about their own social identity, but receive signals about it from their social environment, before making their choice of social group. Their choice of social group affects the benefits that others derive from their choice of social group, and vice-versa. We solve for a rational expectations equilibrium of this interaction under two types of social incentives. In the first, individuals prefer to be among others who share the same social identity. We call this an affinity incentive. In the second, individuals prefer to be among others whose identity does not match the identity that is the group's focus. We call this a popularity incentive. We show that social welfare is always higher under the affinity than under the popularity incentive.

 

3.              “Capital Mobility and Conglomerate Mergers”

4.              “Antitrust Market Delineation”

5.              “Corporate Structure and the Rate of Return in Investment”

6.              “The Economics of the First Amendment: Corruption, Protest, and Revolution” (with Hugo Mialon)

7.              “Economics of Eminent Domain”

8.             “An Economic Theory of Figurative Speech,” with Hugo Mialon

 

Abstract: This paper is an application of economics to the study of language. We distinguish speech according to whether it is literal or figurative. Literal speech conveys its exact meaning according to common usage. Figurative speech conveys a meaning different from its literal meaning. In a simple signaling model of communication between a speaker and a listener, we analyze the conditions for speech to be figurative in equilibrium, and for figurative speech to be more efficient than literal speech. The model highlights the tradeoff that figurative speech can be less costly than literal speech, but is also more likely to be misunderstood. The results shed light on many linguistic phenomena, including irony, metaphor, lyric poetry, neighborhood slang, academic jargon, political correctness, religious parables, and scientific models.

 

9.              “Searching for Quality,” with R. Preston McAfee and Hugo Mialon